Allerton 2015 Paper Abstract


Paper ThB4.5

Wang, Pengwei (University of Calgary), Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh (University of Calgary), Lin, Fuchun (university of calgary)

Erasure Adversarial Wiretap Channels

Scheduled for presentation during the Regular Session "Information Theory III" (ThB4), Thursday, October 1, 2015, 11:50−12:10, Pine

53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Sept 29-Oct 2, 2015, Allerton Park and Retreat Center, Monticello, IL, USA

This information is tentative and subject to change. Compiled on December 5, 2021

Keywords Information Theory, Security and Trust, Coding Theory


In an erasure adversarial wiretap channel the adversary can select a fraction of the codeword to read, and another fraction of the codeword to erase. The model can be seen as an extension of the wiretap II model where the adversary not only selects its view of the transmitted word, %eavesdrop the communication over adversarial channel, but also can erase a fraction of the codeword. Erasure adversarial wiretap codes provide security and reliability for communication over erasure adversarial wiretap channels. We derive an upper bound on the rate of these codes, and give an efficient construction of a code family that achieves the bound, hence deriving secrecy capacity of these channels. We then show that the construction can also be used for adversarial wiretap channels in which instead of erasing code components, the adversary can add noise to the codeword. The resulting construction is the only adversarial wiretap code with constant alphabet size.



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